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R

ECENT decisions of the Civil Aeronautics Board have sharply
focused the attention of the air transportation industry upon airline competition. Other Board decisions to be issued in 1956 will
unquestionably maintain the subject of competition among our
domestic air carriers as one of paramount importance in the minds of
everyone directly or indirectly concerned with air transportation. And
as the trunklines - particularly those other than the "Big Four"activate their newly authorized route grants over the next several
months, many of them with aircraft fleets which suddenly are inadeuate both as to size and type, they must wrestle with a complex of
competitive problems, problems which have not arisen before, in their
present form at least, and which have not been faced before by many
of the carrier managements now confronted by them.
It is the purpose of this article to establish the fact that the extent
of effective competition among our domestic trunklines remained
relatively static from 1947 through 1954 -relative to its tremendous
growth in the seven years prior to 1947 - and more importantly,
relative also to the great increase in effective competition which appears to be inevitable in 1956 and future years. Significant characteristics of the newly intensified competitive system are then to be pointed
out, emphasizing particularly the increasing proportion of principal
airline markets served, not by one or two airlines, but by three, four
and five of them - all competing, at least potentially, on an effective
basis. The dangers implicit in the increased extent of this multi-carrier
competition will then be mentioned - dangers which were pointed
out and analyzed some seven years ago in another, more thorough
' The opinions herein expressed are strictly those of the author and in no
way reflect the views of the Civil Aeronautics Board or its sanction thereof.
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study2 which the writer was privileged to co-outhor, and which were
dealt with at that time from the standpoint of airline services and
prices offered United States travelers and also as to the effect of such
competition upon airline earnings.
The writer presents this material in an effort to provide a method
by which a most important problem can be better understood and
measured; rather than with any idea of predicting for any carrier or
for the industry as a whole what effect the newly authorized competition will have. The recent new route grants authorized by the Board,
together with others now pending before it, are so sweeping in their
effect that the most intelligent planning and management are called
for on the part of both the industry and the Board itself, if the maximum benefits possible are to accrue to the public. Basic to such
planning efforts is a continuing and accurate analysis of the many and
diverse competitive relationships among all our trunklines. It is hoped
that this study, or perhaps a more thorough one provoked by it, may
be of help in such analyses.
The analysis presented here is concerned almost entirely with the
principal airline "markets," or city pairs, served by each domestic
trunkline carrier. It has been confined to those relatively few markets
for each trunkline which in the aggregate have accounted for at least
50 percent of each carrier's passenger miles during certain indicated
periods. This has been done, of course, since any airline management
plans, equips and operates with its principal revenue producing markets uppermost in mind.
The primary sources for the data presented in this article are first,
"Airline Competition," published by the Harvard Business School in
1949; and secondly, a report prepared in October 1955, by the Civil
Aeronautics Board's Office of Carrier Accounts and Statistics; entitled
"Competition Among Domestic Trunk Air Carriers" and published
in December 1955. The latter report is highly recommended to anyone
interested in competition among our carriers and is particularly significant in that it is the first such study published by the Board's
staff in this very important field. The value of this report both to the
industry and the Board and of the IBM tabulations from which it
was derived will undoubtedly be apparent and should insure its continued preparation, at least once each year.
As generally explained in the technical notes at the end of this
article (Appendix C) there are differences in the type and extent of
airline passenger travel covered by these two primary sources-"Airline
Competition," on the one hand, and the Board's staff study of trunkline competition on the other. By using the basic, detailed IBM tabulations themselves, rather than the summaries of the staff study as
published, the writer has attempted to establish as high a degree of
2

"Airline Competition," by Frederick W. Gill and Gilbert L. Bates, 1949.
Excerpts reprinted by permission from Division of Research, Graduate School
of Business Administration, Harvard University, Boston.
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comparability as possible between the two sources. This was necessary
in order that changes in competitive relationships from 1947 to 1954
could be determined. Complete comparability of these two sources was
not attained, but the effort was sufficiently successful, it is felt, so that
the conclusions drawn are valid.
THE LAST SEVEN-YEAR PERIOD OF STATIC TRUNKLINE COMPETITION

In order that the reader may have a clear understanding of the
continuing importance of passenger travel to our domestic trunklines,
and further, that he may appreciate the fact that the principal sources
of trunkline revenues are concentrated in very few markets, these two
points will be touched on before discussing competitive relationships
in the trunkline industry.
Importance of PassengerRevenue
Passenger revenues have continued to comprise the predominant
revenue source for the domestic trunklines. As Appendix A indicates,
for the 13 domestic trunklines in the year ended June 30, 1955,
passenger revenues accounted for 93.2 percent of total non-mail transport revenues for all domestic trunklines. Similar percentages for
earlier pre-war and post-war years were 93.6 percent for the trunks
in the 1939-1941 period and 92.39 percent for the trunkline industry
in the 1946-1948 period. 3 Passenger traffic and revenues therefore
have always been and continue to be the controlling source of revenue
for the trunkline industry.
Furthermore, as shown by the appendix table, passenger revenues
account for almost as important a share of all trunkline, non-subsidy
revenues, approximately 91 percent in the year ended June 30, 1955.
Market Concentration
Despite the sweeping changes which have taken place since the
1947-1948 period in trunkline operations relative to traffic volumes
carried, equipment operated and subsidy mail pay eliminated, the following table indicates that trunkline air transportation continues to
be characterized by a concentration into very few markets of the carriers' most significant sources of revenue.
The table indicates that whereas the average trunkline among the
16 in existence in 1940 and 1947 derived half of its passenger revenue
from only six to ten city pairs or airline markets, this number had
increased to approximately 15 in 1954. In that year, the average of
the Big Four carriers was approximately 21 markets whereas that for
the smaller trunklines was approximately 12. In light of the tremendous increase in passenger traffic movement over the domestic trunkline systems in the last seven years, this table demonstrates that the
major sources of airline revenue remain surprisingly few in number.
3 "Airline Competition," supra, page 36, exhibit 1.12.
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TABLE 1-

NUMBER MARKETS GENERATING FIFTY PERCENT OF
TRUNKLINE REVENUES

Base Carrier*
Big Four
American
United
Eastern
TWA
Average
Other Trunklines
Delta
(C&S)
Capital
Northwest
National
Braniff
(MCA)
Western
(Inland)
Continental
Northeast
Colonial
Average

September
1940

September
1947

September
1954

14
13
8
8

23
18
11
10

20
16
35
15

10.8

15.5

21.5

7
3
5
8
4
11
4
2
5
5
3
1

7
9
15
10
2
16
11
46
5
6
5
1

20

4.8

7.6

29
9
3
26

7
10
2
12.4

Trunkline Average
6.3
9.6
12.2
* In order of domestic non-subsidy transportation revenues, year ended
June 30, 1955. Further trunkline listings will be in the same order. See
Appendix D for listing of markets by carrier.
An examination of the table, however, when made with a knowledge of the basic data studied and when considered in light of the
fact that the number of trunklines has declined from 16 in the earlier
periods to 13 for the year 1954, supports the conclusion that the
number of principal city pairs shown is, if anything, overstated. This
is true, of course, since as pointed out in the technical notes (Appendix
C), the passenger traffic included in the basic data for September 1954
was not as complete as that included in the airline competition study
for the months of September 1940 and September 1947. The combination of six trunkline carriers since 1947 into three presently existing
trunk.s-Delta, Braniff and Western-would in and of itself tend to
increase for those carriers the number of major markets for the new
systems.
In the case of three trunklines-American, United and Northwestthe number of major markets (those accounting for 50 percent of
passenger revenues during the September 1954 survey period) had
actually declined despite the approximate threefold increase in passenger traffic and revenue experienced by these carriers since 1947. In
the case of six other trunklines-TWA, National, Western, Continental,
Northeast and Colonial-the increase in number of major markets has
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been relatively slight when considered in light of their substantial
passenger growth. Even in September 1954 TWA's major markets
totaled only 15 and for the other five named carriers the largest number
was ten. The trunkline air transportation industry, therefore, has
always been and continues to be primarily dependent upon relatively
few numbers of major revenue producing markets or city pairs.
The ensuing discussion will be confined principally to a study of
the competitive relationships among these domestic trunkline carriers
in their relatively few major markets. No attempt has been made in
this study to evaluate the significance of the additional competition
representedby the nonscheduled carriers which the Civil Aeronautics
Board has recently denominated as Supplemental Air Carriers. That
such carriers may be an effective competitive source in the future is
of course a possibility, but in the absence of passenger origin and
destination data for them, it has been impossible to include them in
this analysis.
Effective Competition in Major Markets
For purposes of this study the term "effective competition" is used
in a manner consistent with its use in the airline competition study
published by the Harvard Business School in 1949. 4 In that study the
point was made at the outset that airline routings or services could
be deemed competitive in several senses, depending on one's point of
view, but that to be effectively competitive the routings or services
must have actually had a demonstrable effect upon traffic carried or
airline services rendered. Specifically, as to effective competitive routings, the following appears on page 23 of "Airline Competition":
". .. For such classification purposes an effective competitive
routing was designated as one which carried 10% or more of the
passengers moving via the most heavily traveled routing.3
"3 This 10% rule, while admittedly arbitrary, was adopted by
the authors after extensive discussion with leading airline traffic
and sales officials. A 10% participation by a competitor was felt to
be the minimum participation necessary to constitute. effective
competition from the standpoint of influencing a competitor's service or rates under normal conditions."
The present study adopts this concept since it has gained in recent
years at least some acceptance by the airline industry and the Civil
Aeronautics Board in various route and rate proceedings.
With this definition of effective competition in mind, there are a
variety of analytical methods which could be used to advantage in
4 "Airline Competition," supra, pages 15, 16 and 23. The following discussion of competitive relationships among the trunk carriers is confined to the
actual passenger traffic of each carrier as reported in the various CAB traffic
surveys mentioned. It is recognized that these passenger figures resulted not
only from varying degrees of management sales efficiency but also from differences among the trunks as to the many "determinants" of airline service. The
importance of the other factors is, of course, recognized, but the scope of this
article did not permit a full discussion of them. For such a discussion, relative
to the 1940-48 period, see "Airline Competition," supra, Chapter 5, page 160.
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describing competitive relationships among our domestic trunkline
carriers in the recent and more distant past. The Board's staff in its
recently released study of trunkline competition has used several
interesting and valuable analytical techniques, but that study dealt
only with passenger traffic movement in September 1954. Since the
present study is concerned with competition in not only that month,
but in earlier months, seven and fourteen years before, techniques
somewhat different than those used by the Board's staff are used here.
The first and perhaps the most obvious comparison to be made
shows the extent to which each trunkline's major market passenger
miles were subject to effective competition.
TABLE 2-

PERCENT OF EACH TRUNKLINE'S PASSENGER MILES IN MAJOR
MARKETS SUBJECT TO EFFECTIVE COMPETITION

Base Carrier
American
United
Eastern
TWA
Delta
(C&S)
Capital
Northwest
National
Braniff
(MCA)
Western
(Inland)
Continental
Northeast
Colonial
N.C. No Competition

September
1940
41.3%
58.1
22.4
76.2
N.C.
(38.6)
N.C.
34.1
23.2
31.3
(N.C.)
16.2
(N.C.)
N.C.
N.C.
N.C.

September
1947
75.9%
86.7
65.2
82.0
68.0
(34.3)
61.8
41.6
100.0
58.6
(N.C.)
68.6
(38.9)
12.9
47.1
N.C.

September
1954
81.0%
89.0
56.5
83.9
45.0
68.7
59.4
100.0
45.9
69.4
9.4
11.7
100.0

As shown by this table and its accompanying Chart 1, in September
1954, all of National's and Colonial's principal revenue producing
markets were subject to effective competition from other trunklines.
American, United and TWA were next in order of percentage of
principal markets' passenger miles effectively competed for and the
other trunklines had somewhat lesser competitive problems, with
Continental showing less than 10 percent of its major market passenger
miles effectively competed for.
The extent of effective competition in principal markets has increased somewhat for most carriers in the last seven-year period; but
it is equally true that the increase has not been nearly as great in the
last seven years as it was from 1940 to 1947. In this earlier seven-year
period only four of the 16 trunkline carriers experienced either no
increase in effective competition or a relatively slight increase. Five
carriers-Delta, Capital, Inland, Continental and Northeast-which had,
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in 1940, experienced no effective competition, were subjected by September 1947 to a substantial degree of competition in their principal
markets. Other trunkline carriers had in this first seven-year period
experienced similarly increasing competitive problems.
From September 1947 to -September 1954, however, the extent of
effective competition, as measured merely by this first yardstick, did
not become significantly more intensified. It may therefore be concluded that merely as, to importance of markets exposed to effective
competition, our domestic trunklines from 1940 to 1947 saw a substantial increase but that in the next seven-year- period the situation
changed only in minor degree.
Competitive Ratio Comparison
Aside from analyzing the mere exposure in their principal markets
of our trunk carriers to effective competition, it is of course important
for any competitive study to indicate how effectively each of the trunk
carriers has been able to cope with its competitors in its main markets.
One method of measuring each carrier's effectiveness in meeting its
competitive problems is by use of a "competitive ratio" comparison.
This is the ratio of the passenger miles carried by all competitors in
all of a carrier's main markets to the passenger miles of that carrier
(called the "base" carrier) in such markets.
This means that if in a given base carrier's principal markets its
competitors have generated more traffic than has the base carrier, then
that carrier's competitive ratio would be more than one. If, on the
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other hand, either because the base carrier had relatively few competitive markets or because it generated considerably more traffic in its
principal markets than did its competitors, then its competitive ratio
would be less than one. And of course, if a base carrier in all its
principal markets succeeded in carrying 90 percent or more of the
total passenger traffic, its competitive ratio would be zero.
Table 3 and Chart 2 show the competitive ratios for each of the
domestic trunkline carriers for the survey months analyzed in 1940,
1947 and 1954.
TABLE 3 -

Base Carrier
American
United
TWA
Eastern
Delta
Capital
Northwest
National
Braniff
Western
Continental
Northeast
Colonial

COMPETITIVE RATIO COMPARISON'

September
1940

September
1947

September
1954

0.64
0.72
0.88
0.13
0.232
0.00
0.27
0.10
0.483
0.054
0.00
0.00
0.00

0.96
1.04
1.50
0.40
0.492
1.21
0.50
2.34
0.343
1.394
0.02
2.76
0.00

0.98
1.16
1.47
0.57
0.52
1.62
0.63
1.08
0.55
1.45.
0.01
20.41
0.38

1 The ratio of passenger miles generated by competitors in a base carrier's principal markets to the passenger miles generated by the base carrier
in those markets.
2 Delta and Chicago and Southern combined.
8 Braniff and Mid-Continent combined.
4 Western and Inland combined.
eN*RT 2.

COMPETIVE

RATIO COMPARISON

TRUNKLINE
'otX

SEPTEMBER

CARRIERS

1940, 1947 1954

20.41

In September 1954, Continental and Colonial with very low ratios are
at one extreme, indicating their relative freedom from effective competition; while Capital, TWA and Western with high competitive
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ratios are at the other end, indicating that these three carriers, in
terms of this index, had the most serious competitive problem.5
As to the change in competitive ratios from 1940 to 1947 as compared with such change from 1947 to 1954, the table and chart indicate
that the greatest general increase in ratios took place during the first
seven-year period, with relatively little change occurring in the last
seven years. On the basis of this competitive ratio comparison, therefore, it can again be concluded that the extent and significance of
airline competition increased considerably more in the seven years
preceding 1947 than in the seven-year period after that year.
The "Multiple Carrier" Competitive Problem
Aside from the two competitive aspects already covered-the percent of each trunkline's principal markets served competitively and
the competitive ratios of each trunkline carrier-a third aspect worth
analyzing is the extent to which each trunkline air carrier must cope
with more than one effective competitor in its principal revenue producing markets.
Particularly in light of recent Board decisions which have substantially expanded the route systems of many of our domestic trunkline
carriers, it is important to understand how great a proportion of each
trunkline's business is generated in competition with more than a
single effective competitor. If, for example, in the case of trunkline
"A" its principal markets are exposed in substantial degree to effective
competition and if, despite that substantial exposure, trunkline A's
competitive ratio is low, a significant conclusion is, of course, that
trunkline A has been highly successful in its competitive efforts.
It is of even greater significance, however, if trunkline A is similarly
successful where it has been faced in most of its main markets by not
only one, but two or three effective competitors.
It is this "multiple carrier" type of competition which was discussed at some length in the 1949 competitive study "Airline Competition." As will be shown later, it is also this type of competition which
recent decisions of the Civil Aeronautics Board have greatly expanded
in three large new route proceedings and which may be even further
extended in other significant new route proceedings now pending.6
5 In terms of this one index, Northeast Airlines appears to have by far the
greatest competitive problem with a ratio considerably greater than any other
trunkline. It should be borne in mind, however, that this high ratio is due to the
fact that Northeast was overwhelmed by its competitors in its only competitive
market-New York/Boston-and that that one competitive market accounted
for only 12 percent of its revenue passenger miles in its principal airline markets.
For this reason, Northeast's very high competitive ratio is misleading.
6 New York-Chicago Service Case, Docket 986 et al., Order Serial No. E-9737;
Service to Denver, Docket 1841 et al., Order Serial No. E-9735 and E-9759;
Additional Northeast-Southwest Service Case, Docket No. 2355 et al., Order
Serial No. E-9758; pending cases include the New York-Florida Case, Docket
No. 3051 and the Great Lakes-Southeast Service Case, Docket No. 2396 et al.
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TABLE

4

-

EXTENT OF "MULTIPLE CARRIER" COMPETITION-SEPTEMBER

1954

Base Carrier'sPassengerMiles in
Principal Competitive Markets-September 17-30, 1954
Total
Competitive
Passenger
Base Carrier Miles (000)

Percent
Distribution by Number of Competitors*
Two
Three
Four
Competitors
Competitors
Competitors

American
United
Eastern

59,413
62,780
27,670

26.0%
39.2
96.8

71.0%
60.8
3.2

TWA

44,777

33.3

66.7

0

0
14.6
9.1
0
0
67.1
0
100.0.
0

0
14.2
9.7
0
0
0
0
0
0

Delta
6,583
100.0
Capital
10,621
71.2
Northwest
9,870
81.2
National
10,641
100.0
Braniff
4,874
100.0
Western
6,198
32.9
Continental
344
100.0
Northeast
267
0
Colonial
2,234
100.0
* Including the base carrier as one competitor.

3.0%
0
0

As shown by the table, American, United and TWA of all carriers,
had by far the greatest competitive problem in terms of multiple
carrier competition in September 1954. Western and Northeast appear
also to have a significant multiple carrier competitive problem but the
smaller proportion of the principal markets of these carriers which
were subject to effective competition of any kind clearly excludes them
7
from comparison in these terms with American, United and TWA.
The trunkline carriers having no multi-carrier competitive problem
in September 1954 were Delta-CkS, National, Braniff, Continental and
Colonial, while Eastern's problem in this area was negligible (only
3.2 percent of Eastern's competitive passenger miles were of the multiple carrier type).
An additional table, Appendix' B, lists the three or more competitor
markets for each trunkline and the percent of each carrier's competitive market passenger mile total in such multiple carrier markets in
1954. A comparison of the listing in Appendix B with a similar list
for September 19478 demonstrates that for the trunks as a whole the
multi-carrier competitive problem remained practically unchanged
from 1947 through 1954. For example, in September 1954, American
Airlines had two fewer multi-carrier competitive markets than in 1947.
For many of the trunks there was no increase whatsoever in their
number of multiple carrier competitive markets and further, for
Eastern, Northwest, Capital and Western, there was only one more
multiple carrier market in 1954 than in 1947. This very slight increase
7 See Table 2.
8 See "Airline Competition," supra, pp. 48-50, Exhibit 1.16.
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for these four carriers is of practically no significance, of course, in
light of the increase in the total number of their principal revenue
producing markets-particularly in the case of Eastern and Capital.
A reasonable overall conclusion, therefore is that there was no significant change in the trunkline multi-carrier competitive problem from
1947 to 1954.
FUTURE COMPETITIVE PROBLEMS

Recent Operating Results
The foregoing discussion has indicated that during the seven-year
period prior to 1955, the extent and intensity of competition among
our domestic trunklines, when measured in several ways, did not
increase, but remained practically static. In other terms, however,
airline operating results have been anything but static. Trunkline
earnings and profits increased substantially as passenger traffic volumes
mounted steadily each year, beginning in 1949. Despite the introduction by all trunklines of substantial numbers of larger, faster aircraft
from 1949 on, and in the face of declining average passenger fare yields,
the trunklines maintained sufficiently high passenger load factors so
that, with adequate cost controls, operating results were favorable
during the 1949-1955 period.
A few comparisons between the 1947-1948 "depression" years of
domestic air transport and the year ended June 30, 1955, will point
up the extent to which conditions improved for our domestic trunkline industry. The net worth of the trunks increased some 115 percent
from about $180,000,000 to more than $390,000,000. Total invested
capital increased from just over $320,000,000 to more than $575,000,000 (or more than 75 percent), while the ratio of debt to total capital
fell from some 43 percent to approximately 32 percent. In 1947 the
trunklines reported a net operating loss after taxes and interest of
some $23,500,000 while for the fiscal year 1955, they reported a profit
of more than $65,000,000. From 1947-1948 to fiscal 1955 trunkline
nonmail transportation revenue per revenue ton mile fell off some
five percent, but this drop was more than offset by a 19 percent drop
in operating expense per revenue ton mile. Accompanying this decline
in unit costs, and a major factor responsible for the decline, was the
tremendous technological advance in trunkline aircraft. This advance
accounted in large part for the great increase in employee productivity
-revenue ton miles per employee more than doubled for the trunks
from 1947-1948 to 1955.
Rationale of Recent CAB Decisions
It was with this greatly improved trunkline operating record before
it that the Civil Aeronautics Board considered the several major new
route cases which it decided in the last three months of 1955. A
reading of the Board decisions indicates that in addition to an aware-
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ness of the overall industry operating trends in recent years, the Board
regarded their individual records as having real significance-particularly that of the Big Four group as compared with that of the nine
other, smaller trunklines. It was' apparent to the Board that the relative positions of the trunklines had not changed to any marked extent
since 1938; that the Big Four had consistently dominated the domestic
industry as to volume of traffic, revenues and profits, and that while
the operating results of each of the 13 carriers had improved markedly
during recent years, the Big Four's dominance would continue unless
the smaller lines were definitely favored by lucrative new route awards
in the pending proceedings.
The remarkable similarity of each carrier's growth to that of the
others, or the similarity in growth of the Big Four to that of other
carrier groups can be clearly shown in a variety of ways. One method,
in terms of the "profitability index"-revenue ton miles per station
served-is shown in the following table.
TABLE

5,-

REVENUE TON-MILES PER STATION SERVED BY TRUNKLINES

DURING FIRST TWO AND LAST Two YEARS OF CAB JURISDICTION

Carrier

1938-1939
Average

1953-1954
Average

Growth*

433
447
451
288
404

6,438
5,061
6,173
3,415
5,082

14.9
11.3
13.7
11.9
12.6

90
96
183
15
94
75
97

1,435
1,543
2,964
2,335
927
1,000
1,534

15.9
16.1
16.2
155.7
9.9
13.3
15.9

Big Four

American
United
TWA
Eastern
Average
Middle Six

Deltat
Capital
Northwest
National
Branifft
Westernt
Average
Small Three

Continental
Northeast
Colonial
Average
The number of times the 1953-54
t Merged figures.

28
17
74
28
average was of

17.8
497
19.1
325
6.0
441
15.0
421
the 1938-39 average,

In terms of growth from 1938-1939 to 1953-1954, ten of our 13 domestic
trunklines have grown from 11 to 19 times. Two other trunks have
grown somewhat less rapidly, while one has grown much more rapidly
than any of the others. In light of the length of the period involved,
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however,-16 years-and the drastic changes which have taken place
within the industry during that time, it is surprising that the various
rates of growth are not more diverse. In terms of carrier groups, the
Big Four average growth was exceeded by that of both the middle six
and the small three groups, but the dominant position of the Big Four
remained unquestioned. It is clear from all three of the recent Board
decisions-the New York-Chicago, Denver Service, and SouthwestNortheast cases-that the Board intended to reduce this dominance,
and toward that end has already granted substantial new route awards
and improvements to six of the nine smaller trunklines.
Thus, in the Southwest-Northeast Service Case, the Board made
the following statement at page 3 of the mimeographed decision:
"As we pointed out in the New York-Chicago Case the statutory
objective of a sound national air route structure requires, in the
selection of a carrier to provide needed new services, consideration
of the applicants' competitive positions and their relative need for
strengthening. It is vital, in our opinion, to so develop the national
air route structure as to tend to decrease rather than increase the
gap between the9 relative size of the Big Four carriers and the
smaller trunks."
The pertinence of these observations to this study is, of course,
first, to point out the greatly intensified competitive situation among
our trunklines which will inevitably result, after more than seven years
of practically no increase in competition; and second, to identify certain characteristics of the newly authorized competitive services by
way of anticipating generally some of the problems which must be
faced and resolved by both the carriers themselves and the Board if
the new competition is to redound to the benefit of the overall public
interest.
The Increase in "Multi-Carrier"Competition
It is immediately apparent that a significant aspect of the increased
competition resulting from recent Board decisions is the extent to
which our principal trunkline air travel markets will in the future
be served not by one or two carriers, but by three, four or five airlines.
As has already been demonstrated, the principal markets of only three
of our trunklines-American, TWA and United-were served extensively in 1954 by three or more effective competitors. The other trunks
had as their principal sources of revenue either two-carrier competitive
markets, or monopoly markets.
Some indication of the sweeping changes which will take place in
the direction of more multi-carrier competition is shown in the table
below, which categorizes main markets of the Big Four according to
number of competitors before and after the three recent new route
decisions of the Board.
9 Order Serial No. E-9758, decided November 21, 1955.
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TABLE 6-INCREASING SIGNIFICANCE OF MULTI-CARRIER
COMPETITIVE PROBLEM

September
Big Four PrincipalMarkets:

After recent
C.A.B.

1954

Decisions

Monopoly City Pairs
Two Competitor Pairs
Three Competitor Pairs
Four Competitor Pairs
Five Competitor Pairs

28
33
11
1
0

12
30
24
5
2

73

73

51,599
117,233
120,744
4,643
0

17,296
97,116
121,880
32,962
24,965

294,219

294,219

Total
Big Four PassengerMiles (000) *
In Their PrincipalMarkets:
Monopoly City Pairs
Two Competitor Pairs
Three Competitor Pairs
Four Competitor Pairs
Five Competitor Pairs
Total

Based on Big Four Passenger Miles Generated in their Principal Markets
in period September 17-30, 1954.
As shown by the table, the number of city pairs with three or more
competitors will probably jump from 12 to 31, and more importantly,
this will mean that multi-carrier competition, which in 1954 comprised
only 43 percent of the Big Four main markets, will probably account
in the future for some 61 percent of such revenue sources. If, furthermore, it can be anticipated that in other pending major route cases
additional new route grants may be made similar to those recently
issued, three or more competitors may well be competing for 75 percent or more of the principal revenue sources of the Big Four.
Also since more of the new competitive awards have been granted
to the smaller trunklines, it is obvious that the great expansion of
multi-carrier competition will involve these carriers to a much greater
extent than even before. The validity of this conclusion is shown by
the fact that one or more of the smaller trunklines have recently been
added by the Board in 17 of the Big Four's principal city pairs, which
accounted in the September 17-30, 1954 period for 67,600,000 of the
Big Four passenger miles. In none of these 17 markets did any of
the Big Four carriers receive an award. By way of comparison, in only
eight of such main markets, accounting for 33,939,000 1assenger miles,
one or more of the Big Four carriers received new route awards; and
finally, in three. markets, generating 11,523,000 Big Four passenger
miles, route awards have recently been granted to both Big Four and
smaller trunkline carriers.
In net effect then, the three Board decisions most recently issued
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have accentuated the multi-carrier competitive problem considerably,
and have been characterized by extensions of medium and small trunklines into many of the principal revenue producing city pairs of the
Big Four.
Future Significance of Multi-Carrier Competition

Just what the increased intensity of competition among our trunklines may mean to the trunklines themselves and to the public is a
highly conjectural matter. In many long-haul markets with relatively
light traffic flow, two or three-carrier competition has been created for
the first time. In such markets, there is the possibility that no one of
the competitors will generate sufficient traffic to support a frequent,
high quality air service. Where this happens, of course, is it not
conceivable that the traveling public will be worse off with the
competitive service than it was without it?
Other obvious questions one might ask are, can the smaller trunks
chew what they've bitten off, and if so, how soon can they be expected
to with the limited size of their present fleets? Will the Big Four tend
to concentrate their efforts

-

perhaps more than formerly

-

on pre-

serving their leading position relative to the smaller nine trunks, rather
than competing against one another? Or, since each of the Big Four
has also received new route improvements from the Board recently,
will they not give first consideration to exploiting their own newly
authorized services? And also, as the smaller trunklines have been
somewhat "upgraded," will they not tend to concentrate upon the
longer-haul, more lucrative markets of their new systems and relax,
somewhat, their efforts in their secondary markets? If so, what will
this-mean to the cities and their travelers making up such markets?
Is there not a real possibility that in these secondary areas the
local service carriers will be able to offer these travelers a high quality
of service, if given the opportunity, regardless of what the tendencies
of the trunks may be?
These and many other equally provocative questions are naturally
prompted by the recent route grants. They give at least some indication of the gravity of the problems which must be faced by the industry
and the Board in the next few years. Since the writer makes -no claim
to clairvoyance he does not have the answers, but certain observations
would, perhaps, be in order. These observations will take the form of
precautionary comments, based in large part upon the study coauthored by the writer seven years ago during the airline depression
of 1947 and 1948.
As pointed out in that study, competition among our air carriers
has resulted in a wide variety of direct benefits to the traveling public.
Such benefits have included the insurance to the United States public
of the fastest, most luxurious aircraft. Other benefits include numerous examples of improved airline service quality when measured in
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terms unrelated to the type of aircraft flown. The effectiveness of the
competitive force in the field of passenger rates has been demonstrated
in recent years as low fare air coach has expanded more and more.
The writer takes this opportunity, therefore, to reaffirm his belief that
competition among airlines has been and continues to be a potent
factor in improving service and reducing fares offered the public.
As was recognized in the Harvard Study, however, the force of
competition among our trunklines can be relied upon only so far to
improve service quality and reduce fare levels. And this is particularly true where the competitive force is exerted by the third or fourth
competitor in a market. Also, and of equal significance, is the proposition that the competitive force should not be underestimated in its
possible adverse effect upon airline earnings.
Thus, as to competition's effect upon flight schedules offered our
travelers, the following mixed conclusions appearing at page 131 of
"Airline Competition" are in point:
....,competition has been and continues to be an important
force in assuring the traveler of a high standard of schedule service,
especially in major markets where the ability to support the schedule patterns of the competing carrier is unquestionable even with
the increased size and speed of new aircraft.
"... ,there is no basis for the presumption that competition
will invariably bring about a higher standard of schedule service.
Due consideration must be given to those factors which determine
the schedule service which a particular airline can provide in a
given market."
Of even more significance to this present article in light of recent
Board decisions, are the following statements, accompanying the conclusions already quoted:
"... , the quality of schedule service has been significantly
improved in relatively few markets by the addition of a third and
fourth competitor; in fact, in some cases, this amount of competition has led to a lack of significant improvements in service and
even, in extreme cases, to a deterioration in service.
"... , the only measure of schedule quality which has been
improved by competition in practically all cases is that of the volume of seats scheduled or its equivalent-space availability."
And in similar vein are two other conclusions appearing in the
same context:
the fact that competition did not improve the quality of
airline schedules in more than half of the markets studied is significant of the type of competitive authorizations which have
accompanied the expansion of the domestic route structure. In
other words, many competitive routes have been authorized over
which the competing lines have not been able to improve schedule
service because of the existence of other determinants of airline
service which have restricted the efforts of the airline managements in these markets.
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the effect of striving for competitive superiority in some
markets has in some instances had an adverse effect on the quality
of schedule service which a carrier has rendered in its noncompetitive markets. On the other hand, in some instances, the competition
for some markets has often brought about an improved quality of
schedules in noncompetitive markets. Here again the individual
circumstances are determinative of the end result."
These general observations were supplemented and clarified in the
1949 airline competition study with detailed case studies of particular
airline markets. The New York-Chicago case study, for example, concluded that while airline competition had been an important influence
between New York and Chicago in improving schedule service from
1940 through 1948, nevertheless,
" , the quality of service offered to the New York-Chicago
traveler during the postwar period was not noticeably improved
by the competition of three and four carriers rather than two. A
high frequency of service with nonstop flights would undoubtedly
have been offered to the traveler had only two airlines competed in
this market. .". 1
and, further, that
"... , although the existence of three effective competitors for
many years between New York and Chicago and the addition of a
fourth competitor in 1945 did not adversely affect the quality of
service in this market to a marked extent, there is some evidence
of a trend in this direction., In the face of falling demand, the
principal competitors concentrated flights at peak periods of de,0
mand with some sacrifices in frequency ....
Similarly, in the field of airline fares, the study found that competition among the trunklines was a major influence in preserving a low
air fare level within the United States, but concluded that
"... , the fares charged the traveler in the major airline markets in the domestic United States have not been generally reduced
through the additional competition certificated in such markets.
This has been due to the fact that the base rates and mileages to
which they were applied by the original carriers in constructing
the fares could not be improved by the added carriers. The base
rates of the latter were in general no lower than those used by the
lines serving such markets, and the fare-making routes already in
existence were as short as or shorter than those which the new
carriers could provide.""
and also that
...

,

the importance of airline competition as an influence

upon air fares was necessarily confined somewhat by two other
forces which placed reasonable ceilings upon airline rates. These
were, first, the influence of railroad competition, previously discussed in Chapter 14, and second, the philosophy of certain airline
10 Airline Competition," supra, p. 269.
11 Id., p. 475.
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managements that greater net income would result from lower12
rates entirely aside from the competitive aspects of such rates."'
In none of its recent decisions has the Board differed, basically,
with the foregoing quoted conclusions. The Board has expanded
competition among the trunklines on other grounds, viz., the need
for increasing the size and strength of the trunklines other than the
Big Four, and the belief that such increased strength would at least
indirectly benefit travelers in other cities served on the systems of
the smaller trunks.
At page 4 of its Southwest-Northeast decision, the Board made
this point in the following language:
"We cannot ignore the fact that substantial route awards to
the larger carriers would tend to create a greater unbalance in
carrier size, and thereby adversely affect the ability of the smaller
trunks to compete effectively in markets which they jointly serve
with the larger carriers. We believe that the benefits to be derived
from effective competition will be spread to a greater number of
cities if the size disparity between the smaller and larger carriers is reduced. In many markets which are jointly served today
by a small trunk and a Big Four carrier there is no effective competitive service because the smaller carriers' resources and route
systems inhibit them from challenging their larger competitors.
To the extent that we choose a small trunk instead of a Big Four
carrier to provide a needed new service in high density markets,
we enlarge the small carrier's opportunity to render effective competitive service in other markets which they are already authorized
to serve.
"It is also likely that as the smaller carriers' route systems are
strengthened they will be in a better position to experiment with
the provision of low cost transportation in markets which are
currently served only with first class service." 13
The skeptic may perhaps take issue with the Board on either or
both of these points. He may argue that the smaller trunks have now
been introduced into the "big time," and that their efforts to compete
in their new large markets will be doomed to failure; that at best they
will have to slight their smaller markets in order to serve the big ones
and that in net, they will become weaker rather than stronger.
There is some merit, certainly, to this view, particularly in the
near future. However, the demonstrated effectiveness of some of these
same smaller carriers over the past ten years, in competition with one
or more of the Big Four tends to belie the long run validity of this
skeptical view. And this is true despite the fact that competition,
particularly of the multi-carrier type, has been shown to be costly in
many situations in the past. Two final quotations from "Airline
Competition" are pertinent here. The first bears on the matter of
the effect of competition upon Big Four self-sufficiency in the 19401948 period and appears at page 540 of that study.
12

Id., p. 476.

13 Order Serial No. E-9758, decided November 21, 1955.
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"Eastern Air Lines does not have a system which is naturally
more economical to operate than those of the other three of the
Big Four carriers, rather the contrary; but the relative lack of
competition on this system has made it possible for this carrier
to achieve in large part its outstanding record of earnings. Therefore, if Eastern has been able to achieve this profit record in the
face of definite operational and sales handicaps, it is reasonable to
conclude that if the other of the Big Four, with naturally stronger
systems, had not been duplicated to the extent that they have, the
postwar operations of these carriers would have been possible at
much less of a burden to the government than has in fact been
the case. This observation holds especially true with respect to the
competition which has been authorized in so many major markets
where all three of these other carriers compete with one another."
And again, at page 585, relative to four smaller carriers, a similar
conclusion appears:
"... the force of airline competition has importantly increased
the break-even needs, and the governmental burden indicated
thereby, of all four of the carriers, Capital, National, Northeast,
and Western Air Lines. That competition has played a very important role in adversely affecting break-even needs of this group of
carriers is not surprising, in view of the fact that in the postwar
years they were subject to more effective competition than any of
the other small carriers. Furthermore, the change in competitive
status of these four carriers, postwar over prewar, was much more
drastic than that of the other small airlines.
"... the influence of airline competition in increasing the breakeven needs of these carriers was much more pronounced on their
revenues than on their expenses. With one exception (Northeast),
these carriers achieved relatively low levels of operating cost per
unit produced, despite the competitive influence. In terms of revenues per seat mile, however, these carriers were less successful.
Airline competition, in lowering average fares and load factors,
adversely affected the unit nonmail revenues of the entire group.
The continued high break-even needs which obtained within this
group therefore resulted in large part from the force of airline
competition acting primarily upon revenues."
Since these paragraphs were written-in 1949-all but two of our
domestic trunklines have become economically self-sufficient. This
most important fact, alone, provides good grounds for optimism as to
the future, however fraught with complex problems that future may
be. If air travel volumes continue to increase in the next few years as
they have in the past the dangers implicit in recent extensions of
multi-carrier competition may well be offset by the benefits which can
result to travelers and stockholders alike from the emergence of a
greater number of larger, sounder trunk air carriers.
If, as the skeptics predict, the trunklines tend to concentrate their
best scheduling and sales efforts on their long-haul, competitive marke-ts to the detriment of their smaller cities, it would seem reasonable
that plans should be made by both the industry and the Board to have
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the local service carriers expand their services sufficiently to meet the
*needs of such cities for continued frequent, fully adequate airline
service. Such planning, if begun soon enough, would no doubt present
the opportunity for substantial improvement in the operating results
of the local carriers and a consequent reduction in their dependence
on subsidy mail pay. Basic to whatever planning and management
decisions may be made in the next few, very difficult years, however,
is a continuous and accurate analysis of the changing competitive
relationships about to take place. It is hoped that this study, in pointing out some of the dangers implicit in the new competitive route
awards, and suggesting methods of measuring the changes as they
occur, will be of some help.
APPENDIX A -

IMPORTANCE OF DOMESTIC TRUNKLINE
PASSENGER REVENUES

(Year Ended June 30, 1955)
Passenger Revenues as Percent of

Base Carrier'

Nonmail
Transportation
Revenues

Non-Subsidy
Transportation
Revenues

American
United
Eastern
TWA
Delta
Capital
Northwest

91.4%
92.2
95.6
93.1
93.8
92.8
88.8

89.4%
88.5
93.9
90.1
91.3
90.0
85.7

National
Braniff
Western
Continental
Northeast
Colonial

94.0
94.3
95.6
95.2
94.9
97.2

92.5
91.6
92.2
92.3
93.8
96.8

Trunkline Average

93.2%

*90.6%

1 In order of domestic non-subsidy transportation revenues-year ended
June 30, 1955.
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MULTI-CARRIER COMPETITIVE MARKETS
(September 17-30, 1954)
Base Carrier's PassengerMiles

Base Carrier

Market

Percent of
Base Carrier's
Total
Principal
Competitive
Total
Number*
Competitors (000)
Markets Markets

3
Los Angeles-N. Y.
3
Chicago-New York
3
Chicago-Los Angeles
3
Los Angeles-Wash.
3
New York-San Fran.
3
Boston-Los Angeles
4
Chicago-Washington
3
Chicago-Detroit
3
Boston-Chicago
Total "Multiple Competition"
3
New York-San Fran.
United
3
Los Angeles-N. Y.
Los Angeles-San Fran. 3
3
Chicago-New York
3
Chicago-Los Angeles
San Fran.-Washington 3
Total "Multiple Competition"
3
Louisville-New York
Eastern
Total "Multiple Competition"
Los Angeles-New York 3
TWA
3
New York-San Fran.
3
Chicago-Los Angeles
3
Chicago-New York
3
San Fran.-Wash.
Competition"
Total "Multiple
NONE
Delta
4
Chicago-Wash.
Capital
3
Milwaukee-New York
3
Chicago-Detroit
4
Detroit-New York
Total "Multiple Competition"
4
Detroit-New York
Northwest
Milwaukee-New York 3
Total "Multiple Competition"
NONE
National
NONE
Braniff
Los Angeles-San Fran. 3
Western
Las Vegas-Los Angeles 3

American

Total "Multiple Competition"
NONE
Continental
Boston-New York
Northeast
Total "Multiple Competition"
NONE
Colonial
* Including the base carrier.

3

12,425
8,944
8,583
4,739
2,268
2,075
1,828
1,705
1,427
43,994
10,488
7,200
6,501
6,170
5,241
2,590
38,190
883
883
9
1
7,454
6,153
4,842
1,401
29,869

74.1%

60.0%

60.8%

54.2%

3.2%

1.8%

66.7%

56.0%

28.8%

19.8%

18.8%

11.2%

2,803
1,359
4,162

67.2%

46.6%

267
267

100.0%

11.7%

1,193
905
648
318
3,064
956
899
1,855
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TECHNICAL NoTEs

The basis for selection of the principal city pairs or markets for each
trunkline carrier used in this study is found in the data compiled from the
September 1954 Origin and Destination Traffic Report of the Board prepared by the Office of Carrier Accounts and Statistics and published by that
office in December 1955 under the title of "Analysis of Competitive Markets
Among the Trunklines." This competitive study prepared by the Board's
staff was based upon all city pairs which in the period September 17-30,
1954, generated a minimum of 10,000 passenger miles. As explained in the
technical appendix to that study, the passengers and passenger miles dealt
with therein include more than simply the traffic originating at one point
of each pair and terminating at the other. It also includes additional passengers traveling by two-carrier routings in other city pairs which were
distributed among single-carrier city pairs as explained in the technical
notes following the Board staff's study.
The passenger traffic in the present study therefore includes for September 17-30, 1954, not only that which originates at one city and terminates
at the other city of each city pair but also some additional passengers which
were interchanged at each city of the city pair. Unlike the basic city pair
selection and traffic study in the months of September 1940 and September
1947, however, and summarized in "Airline Competition," the recent CAB
staff study does not include all passengers originating at one point of a city
pair and interchanged at the other point with another air carrier. This
simply means, of course, that relative to September 1940 and September
1947 data then, the September 1954 data used herein, understates the passenger traffic of a carrier in its principal city pairs, and by the same token
somewhat overstates in that month the number of city pairs needed to
represent 50 percent of each carrier's system passenger miles. It is not
believed, however, that this dissimilarity between the data used from the
CAB staff study of trunkline competition and that used in "Airline Competition" for the survey months of 1940 and 1947 is so significant that
comparisons between the two studies cannot safely be made.
Trunklines Covered. Comparative studies of the competitive situation
among the trunklines in September 1954 and the months covered in "Airline
Competition" (March and September 1947 and September 1940 and March
1941) are subject, of course, to the change in the number of trunklines
which took place between 1947 and 1954. The merger of Delta with Chicago
and Southern, that of Braniff with Mid-Continent and of Western Air Lines
with Inland, reduced the number of trunklines to a total of 13 in 1954 as
compared with 16 trunks in existence in the earlier periods. This change is,
of course, recognized and has been pointed out in the tables and charts of
the present article.
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Carrier
American

United

Eastern

LISTING OF PRINCIPAL MARKETS BY CARRIERS
SEPTEMBER 17-30, 1955

City Pair
Los Angeles-New York
Chicago-New York
Chicago-Los Angeles
Los Angeles-Washington
Detroit-New York

Passenger
Miles
(000)
12,425
8,944
8,583
4,739
4,053

Dallas-New York
Dallas-Los Angeles
Boston-New York
New York-Washington
Dallas-San Francisco

3,991
3,942
3,135
3,121
2,543

Detroit-Los Angeles
Buffalo-New York
New York-San Francisco
Boston-Los Angeles
Chicago-Washington

2,358
2,275
2,268
2,075
1,828

Chicago-Detroit
Boston-Chicago
Chicago-Dallas
Cincinnati-New York
El Paso-Los Angeles

1,705
1,427
1,394
1,358
1,218

New York-San Francisco
Chicago-San Francisco
Los Angeles-New York
Los Angeles-San Francisco
Chicago-New York

10,488
9,315
7,200
6,501
6,170

Chicago-Los Angeles
Denver-New York
San Francisco-Seattle
Cleveland-New York
Chicago-Denver

5,241
3,145
3,002
2,951
2,809

Los Angeles-Seattle
San Francisco-Washington
Chicago-Seattle
Chicago-Cleveland
New York-Seattle
Denver-Los Angeles

2,740
2,590
2,541
2,060
1,981
1,777

Miami-New York
Houston-New York
Chicago-Miami
Atlanta-New York
New Orleans-New York

9,547
3,771
3,646
3,226
2,870

New York-Washington
Boston-New York
Detroit-Miami

1,848
1,509
1,299
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Carrier

TWA

Delta

City Pair

Passenger
Miles
(000)

New York-San Antonio
Chicago-Tampa

1,220
1,155

Cleveland-Miami
Boston-Miami
New York-Tampa
Miami-Philadelphia
Houston-Washington

1,128
1,064
1,047
930
920

Houston-New Orleans
Louisville-New York
Miami-Washington
Chicago-Louisville
Atlanta-Washington

910
883
873
847
841

New Orleans-Washington
Jacksonville-New York
Birmingham-New York
Charlotte-New York
St. Louis-Washington

828
820
799
720
687

Atlanta-Chicago
Atlanta-Miami
Miami-St. Louis
Miami-Pittsburgh
Chicago-Indianapolis

686
683
631
614
563

New York-St. Louis
Atlanta-Tampa
Boston-Washington
New York-Richmond
San Antonio-Washington

510
501
493
469
457

Los Angeles-New York
New York-San Francisco
Chicago-Los Angeles
Chicago-San Francisco
Chicago-New York

10,019
7,454
6,153
5,282
4,842

New York-St. Louis
Kansas City-New York
Los Angeles-St. Louis
New York-Pittsburgh
Kansas City-Los Angeles

3,027
2,635
2,354
2,014
1,934

Chicago-Philadelphia
Los Angeles-Pittsburgh
Chicago-Kansas City
San Francisco-Washington
Chicago-Pittsburgh

1,847
1,657
1,461
1,401
1,277

Chicago-Miami
Dallas-New Orleans
Chicago-Houston
Chicago-New Orleans
Atlanta-Dallas

2,002
1,544
1,202
1,106
-1,034
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Carrier

Northwest

Capital

City Pair

403
Passenger
Miles
(000)

Atlanta-Chicago
Chicago-St. Louis
Chicago-Cincinnati
Cincinnati-Miami
Atlanta-Cincinnati

924
892
857
777
572

Chicago-Memphis
Houston-St. Louis
Atlanta-Miami
Detroit-Indianapolis
Birmingham-Dallas

571
493
430
420
368

New Orleans-St. Louis
Memphis-New Orleans
Chicago-Jacksonville
Detroit-Houston
Chicago-Knoxville

342
293
276
273
264

Chicago-Seattle
Minneapolis-New York
Chicago-Minneapolis
New York-Seattle
Detroit-New York

3,745
2,997
2,836
2,688
956

Minneapolis-Seattle
Milwaukee-New York
Detroit-Seattle
Detroit-Minneapolis

909
899
825
757

Chicago-Washington
Cleveland-New York
Detroit-Washington
Milwaukee-New York
New York-Pittsburgh

1,193
1,063
1,017
905
873

Chicago-Cleveland
Chicago-Detroit
Minneapolis-Washington
Norfolk-Washington
Cleveland-Washington

729
648
602
574
561

Pittsburgh-Washington
Chicago-Norfolk
Chicago-Pittsburgh
Detroit-Pittsburgh
Cleveland-Detroit

556
528
504
452
416

Milwaukee-Washington
Buffalo-Washington
Detroit-Milwaukee
Cleveland-Minneapolis
Buffalo-Philadelphia

401
401
398
364
363
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Carrier

City Pair

Passenger
Miles
(000)

Chicago-Grand Rapids
Chicago-Saginaw
Mobile-New York
Cleveland-Milwaukee
Detroit-Norfolk

348
348
339
335
328

Detroit-New York
Rochester-Washington
Flint-New York
Minneapolis-New York

318
310
297
290

National

Miami-New York
Miami-Washington
New York-Tampa

7,922
1,689
1,030

Braniff

Dallas-Houston
Chicago-Dallas
Chicago-Houston
Dallas-San Antonio
Dallas-Denver

1,148
1,103
896
624
621

Western

Chicago-San Antonio
Chicago-Kansas City
Kansas City-Minneapolis/St. Paul
Houston-Tulsa
Denver-Houston

513
511
425
385
382

Dallas-Kansas City
Chicago-Oklahoma City
Chicago-Wichita
Houston-Kansas City
Minneapolis/St. Paul-Omaha

353
334
313
284
280

Kansas City-Omaha
Austin-Dallas
Denver-Oklahoma City
Corpus Christi-Dallas
Amarillo-Dallas

275
268
260
254
214

Kansas-City-Oklahoma City
Austin-Chicago
Minneapolis-St. Louis
Denver-San Antonio
Houston-Oklahoma City
Dallas-Oklahoma City

211
207
203
192
179
177

Los
Los
Las
San
Los
Los

Angeles-San Francisco
Angeles-Minneapolis
Vegas-Los Angeles
Francisco-Seattle
Angeles-Seattle
Angeles-Salt Lake City

2,803
2,080
1,359
1,034
1,002
647
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Carrier

City Pair

Continental

El Paso-Houston
Denver-Kansas City
El Paso-San Antonio
Denver-Tulsa
Albuquerque-Denver
Denver-Wichita
Colorado Springs-Kansas City

Northeast

New York-Portland
New York-Worcester
Boston-Montreal
Boston-New York
Bangor-New York

Passenger
Miles
(000)

New Bedford-New York
New York-Presque Isle
Bangor-Boston
Boston-Pesque Isle
Manchester-New York

Colonial

Montreal-New York
Albany-New York

1,927
307

